Software reliability measurements of safety critical software systems are not well understood. In particular, since the testing of flight control software for high performance aircraft is performed as part of the full-up systems tests, the applicability of reliability models developed for pure software systems is unknown. In this analysis, data from flight tests of the X-29A are studied using the Statistical Modeling and Estimation of Reliability Functions for Software (SMERFS) modeling package. Results from these models are compared to guidelines which were used in the flight test program to determine software readiness.
Introduction
NASA Ames Research Center conducts research on techniques for assessing the dependability of safety critical systems. To date, the tools and techniques have been applied primarily to hardware systems. Advanced automation systems developed within the Agency are becoming more complex in their design and functionality. With software increasingly used as a critical component of safety critical systems, reliability analysis of software in an integrated system context is mandated. Much of the work in software reliability assessment reported in the literature has been done with a focus on To determine the applicability of such models to safety critical systems within an integrated systems context, the X-29A flight control system was selected for analysis. Results from this analysis will establish the basis for incorporating application software reliability measures into Arnes' integrated systems modeling research.
The success of the X-29A flight test program was attributed to effective teamwork, use of and adherence to standards, and a highly reliable aircraft system design. The flight control system software was no exception. Although the first ship of the X-29 program has completed its test program with undeniable success and is often referred to as a model program for others, the actual reliability of the safety critical software had not been previously assessed to provide program managers with a tangible reference. The system proved itself as reliable, but the quantities associated with the reliability were not documented. Latter sections in this paper will present some measures for reliability throughout the context of the flight test program.
The following section provides an overview of the X-29 program. Next the failure reporting process and the testing strategy from which the failure data were collected are presented in Section 3. The data are then segregated and analyzed with engineering judgment, with the results reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results of executing representative models in the SMERFS software package with this data. Comparisons are made between the raw data analysis and the statistical models results. General observations from this analysis are then summarized in the concluding section, with a discussion on the need within NASA to incorporate software reliability techniques. Designed to be fault tolerant, the flight control system was a TMR (triple modular redundant) digital system with a triplex analog backup system.
X-29 Program Overview
Each of the three digital flight control computers contained two digital processors-the control law processor and the I/O processor. The two digital processors were Honeywell HDP-5301 processors and the software for them was written in HDP-5301 assembly language. The operational flight
program contained approximately 29000 instructions. The system was designed to be fail operational/fail safe, hence able to return safely to base after any two failures. Data collection by DFRF on the X-29A flight control system began with the initial flight qualification and continued through operational maintenance phases. For flight qualification, there are two types of testing the flight software must pass:
verification and validation (V&V). Recognized as a critical system component, the flight control software was subjected to the contractor's V&V as well as NASA's independent V&V. Verification ensures that the software operates as specified, through module testing, internal independent review and systems testing. The validation process ensures that the delivered system performs adequately to accomplish the flight requirements. This includes failure modes and effects tests in which failures are artificially induced and observations are made as to the proper system response. Recognizing that the possible combinations of real world scenarios are too numerous to analyze completely, continuous system testing in a simulated environment was key to assuring that the generic faults would more likely be discovered on the ground than in actual flight tests. Validation tests concentrated on the most critical elements of the software: the control laws during normal operation, fault reaction, mode logic, and redundancy management of computers and sensors.
NASA's primary V&V tool was the real-time six-degree-of-freedom hardware-in-the-loop simulation facility. With three flight control computers (two flight qualified), a failure status control panel and an analog computer model of surface actuators, the full range of flight phases was executed. This independent facility was used to identify most of the discrepancies used in this analysis of software reliability. The simulators were run most every day, with a log kept as to the number of hours the flight computers were running. The data presented are from both the simulation laboratory and the actual flight schedule. No data were analyzed from the development phases of the project.
The process and techniques used in the X-29
project to assure safe, reliable software are found in detail in a NASA Technical Memorandum, generated by the software manager at Drydenl .
There was no formal analysis on the reliability of the flight control software within the flight qualification and operational phases of the program at Dryden. As indicated by Duke2, confidence is gained incrementally that the system will function correctly and reliably through Dryden's established qualification, verification and validation process. The X-29A software was developed to the written specifications and tested via a software test matrix. System tests were also generated from the same specifications and executed on the flight control system software to ensure that all of the requirements were implemented as specified. The data used for this analysis were primarily from the full-up systems tests. With this digital system, as is the nature of most experimental-series systems, many changes were incorporated throughout the test program. Among the major changes within the X-29A were modifications to the flight control system that allowed for flight in an expanded flight envelope, addition of a flight test mode that held the flaps at a fixed position, and the addition of a remotely augmented vehicle system which provided steering aids. A detailed description of the modifications can be found in a NASA Technical Memorandum, generated by flight test engineers at Dryden3.
Software DeveloDment and Evolution
Early in the system design, the software was predicted to have four major recompilations or changes to the system for a planned 150 flights. Yet, in the evolution of the software, there were 14 recompilations and multiple patches. This has been attributed to both the "never-ending changes to the requirements" and the successful flight schedule, which allowed for an aggressively high number of flights. The subcontractor applied common requirements from other digital flight control system architectures to this craft and recognized initially that a perfect set of requirements could not exist. They leveraged off of a knowledge-engineering practice using experienced systems and software engineers. They created block diagrams on which to base the new system, and implemented a strict change control process on baseline key documents, such as design plans, development plans and test plans. These practices are among the many within the program that positively contributed to its success?
Dryden Test Philosophy
In the testing phase at NASA Dryden, it is recognized that each executable path and parameter within the code cannot exhaustively be tested. Hence the idea is to operate exhaustively each operational scenario that is specified for flight test, including possible deviations within the flight profile.
The time spent in full-up systems testing was better than 10 to 1 over the actual flight. This increased the chances of errors occurring in the simulator environment beyond that occurring in flight. In addition to this test philosophy, whenever a change was made in the software, a series of mandatory tests were executed and recorded. Among the mandatory tests were: verify proper operation of a large subset of the discrete digital and analog inputs and outputs to the flight control computers, with results documented with an internal System Test report; perform verification tests on all changes incorporated in the new release and document and, using engineering judgment, possibly perform additional system tests (i.e. additional frequency responses, time histories and failure modes and effects tests). All software releases were required to be exposed to a minimum of five hours of piloted simulation.
It is important to point out here that at Dryden, software is viewed as an engineered component of the total system and the validation of this component involves not only looking at the software itself but also the total system. All discrepancy reports and configuration change requests are considered by a multidisciplinary configuration-control board, thus ensuring that the total aircraft is considered and that all possible interactions between hardware and software are understood and tested. It is this board that weighs the overall risk of the subject discrepancy and, through factoring in the probability of occurrence and the repair cost in time, money and schedule slippage, decides on the proper response to compensate for the discrepancy. Their collective judgment is the assurance of the reliability of the entire system.
The mindset of Dryden flight program managers and engineers is not to be stymied by the use of software, but rather to engineer this component with the logic, judgment and analysis of all aircraft components.. With this approach, the success is systematically achieved. Without the use of formal reliability metrics, the consistently used metric was "judging the maturity of a system through experience with that system over time2."
Flight Contro 1 Software and the Flight Schedule
In the flight qualification and operational test phases at Dryden, the flight control software was released in versions, building upon the previous version by increasing the flight envelope, enhancing the type of research capabilities, and repairing detected errors. The software was strictly maintained and the modification history for each module was recorded in the code. More than 100 software changes were implemented from the first submission. All flown software changes were made by the subcontractors who designed and developed the code.
The flight schedule was designed to test and evaluate the aircraft's performance in an expanding operational envelope. There were 14 versions of software flown over the course of 242 flights. The first flights were of minimal functionality with a limited flight control window and flying 0.6 Mach at 30,000 feet, to basically prove the safety of the craft. After incrementally establishing the basic safety of the craft, the first full flight envelope was executed after flight number 16, with the third flight software release version. A complete list of the software versions, number of flights and the test objectives is provided in table 1. As previously indicated, the software was developed in parallel with the entire aircraft design. As with any component of the aircraft, system downtime is required to repair the software. It was determined that to expect 25% downtime for software repair was not unreasonable. This is logical because of the repair cycle involved. Once a problem is detected, the data are retrieved from the flight computers. After the data are analyzed and the source of the problem identified, the appropriate changes in the software are implemented. Next, the changes are subjected to the appropriate V&V tests. Once it passes satisfactorily, the entire flight control system is retested. Only after successfully passing this repair and test process is the software reinstalled in the aircraft and flown again. When Ship 1 was rolled out of the factory, there were between 2400 and 2600 hours already run on each flight control computer. 
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DFRF Data Collection
Using the knowledge gained through past program experiences and incorporating accepted standards, a multitude of system data is collected and maintained throughout each flight test program at Dryden. Although the contractors are required by the government to maintain such records, Dryden also internally adheres to such strict documentation requirements. Among the standard records maintained, those of primary interest for software reliability are discrepancy reports, system test reports, the flight schedule (planned and actual) and software release records.
The X-29 flight program was no exception to this policy. A record Dryden maintained that was unique to this program was a system log of the CPU hours executed on the real-time 6-degree-offreedom simulator. Each of the above documents is important to providing subjective information ration of software reliability analysis techniques need not increase the overhead associated with normal operations. The data already collected and maintained can be utilized and presented with a new perspective -software reliability.
The data collected are already recognized as important in areas such as programmatic planning and issue identification. It is reviewed in a subjective manner and can help to identify specific problem areas within the system. The data can also be reviewed objectively so that the overall trend is not lost in the justification of each and every data point. When an unexpected result or problem Occurred during testing or flight, engineers would describe the problem, indicate which configuration item was the probable cause (of 20 aircraft subsystems), assign a criticality to the problem and date the discrepancy report (DR). Each DR was recorded in a database and submitted to a configuration control board. After corrective action was accomplished and successively tested, it was resubmitted to the board to be closed out. There were three levels of criticality that discrepancies could have: criticality 1 is flight critical, indicating that a loss of life or aircraft could occur; criticality 2 is mission critical, indicating that the research objective could be compromised; and criticality 3 is any other detraction from the specifications that is not life or mission critical. but rather a relative nuisance.
Discrepancy Reports Breakdown -Raw Data Analysis
In the scope of the flight qualification and test phases of the X-29A at Dryden, 296 discrepancy reports were recorded. The breakdown by percentages of these is given in figure 1 , indicating that 30% of the total were due to the flight control system, 65% of which were software related, and of these 21% were safety critical.
Further breakdown of the discrepancies by configuration item, shown in figure 2, indicates that the greatest percentage was due to instrumentation. However, a closer look shows that these were all of criticality level 2 or 3. 60% of the criticality level 1 discrepancies were due to the flight control system software. The amount of discrepancies for software alone indicates at least 2 major points: that the full up systems simulation is critical to the discovery of software errors that may only be discovered in such a setting, and that the incorporation of reliability assessment measures at this phase of the program could be beneficial. The ability to predict the occurrence of the next failure or discrepancy could provide program engineers insight to problem areas during their test efforts, and enable more focused testing on these areas. The Dryden community is acutely aware of the importance of data collection. However, the collection and storage of this information for subsequent traceability is not the end of its usefulness. The graphic representation of such data provides an intuitive overview of the trend in the establishment of reliability in a system. If the cumulative number of discrepancies is increasing at a constant rate,, then the overall system maturity is not being established. However, an indication that the system is gaining in reliability is that the slope of the overall curve tends to decrease in magnitude or, better yet, level off to some asymptote. Looking at the slope of the cumulative discrepancies is not the only indication. It must also be understood what is being performed in the course of generating this curve. In the case of Dryden's test program, all of the information presented in the following set of graphs is from the established full-up systems testing in which complete or subsets of actual flight profiles are conducted. Among the raw data graphs, looking at the monthly intensity of the discrepancies provides an indication of possible seasonal attributes to error discovery. There are no distinguishable patterns found in figure 3 , only indicating that the average monthly discovery is 1. The information provided by the graph of the cumulative software discrepancies vs. execution time reflects the nature of the flight test program, shown in figure 4. The curve of the combined criticality levels seemingly increases at an almost linear rate, with no indication of decrease in discrepancies. However the breakdown by criticality levels shows that most of the safety critical discrepancies were discovered early in the test schedule, with two latent discoveries made far into the flight schedule. Those discrepancies of criticality level 2, mission critical, were the primary influence of the shape of the combined curve. Unlike the criticality level 1 discrepancies that reflect the established safety of the aircraft, the level 2 discrepancies indicate the establishment of a research tool. The nature of an experimental aircraft is that the research performed on it is continually evolving and being enhanced. The almost constant rate of discovery of mission critical DRs reflects this. With no implications on the safety, the occurrence in flight of one of these discrepancies would compromise the research objectives. The final category of discrepancies is the relative nuisance problems. The reporting of these by themselves are understandably scattered throughout the other more critical reports.
Another perspective on the raw discrepancy data is to look at their intensity versus time. By dividing the number of discrepancies by execution time to date, the graph indicates the growth in reliability. Optimally the discovery of problems would be concentrated more to the beginning of the test time and, as time went on, the curve would slope downward. The top curve in figure 5 is the failure intensity with respect to execution time of the combined levels of discrepancies. Although there were several areas where the failure intensity began to decrease, there is no significant downward s l o p e f o r t h e e n t i r e c u r v e . Looking at the individual failure intensity curves it is seen that this is due to the discovery of the criticality level 2 DRs. The intensity of the safety critical DRs provided a classic software reliability growth, highlighted in figure 6 . Based on the cumulative curves in figure 4 , thesc trends are all understandable in the context of this experimcntal flight test program.
Model Execution and Analysis
Quick look analyses of raw data provide an overall view of the current trend toward software reliability. However a set of models exists that take the existing data as input, calculate certain statistics, fit these with defined functions, and generate probabilities for the time of occurrence of future discrepancies5. A representative subset of of Reliability Functions for S~f t w a r e )~,~, was applied to this data set. Results from executing these models are already documented,8 and a synopsis of these results follow.
Attempts were made to execute ten software reliability models for two data formats: test interval data with number of discrepancies reported within that time, and CPU TBE data which presents the actual CPU execution time between discrepancies. Nine of the ten models executed properly. Given that the implication of the criticality level 3 was minimal to the mission and that possibly they were not seriously reported throughout the program, the models were first run on the discrepancies of criticality level 1 and 2. Figure 7 shows that there was no single model that fit this data better than the others and that further these models, from the high]; functional and useful tool SMERFS (Statistical Modeling and Estimation analysis was required.
"' T The number of data points for these models is small and the values vary greatly. As can be seen, both models had difficulty in making a first prediction, with the Littlewood and Verrall model requiring the input of 7 discrepancies before providing a prediction. The S-Shaped model likewise had difficulty, requiring 6 intervals to be input before providing a prediction. The calculated relative errors for these models9, in both the retrodictive fit and the predictive capabilities, are provided in figures 10 and 11. These errors show the lack of predictability by these models on this type of application data, i.e. a small, yet complete, data set.
It is important to note here that the current lack of predictability by the models is not meant to discount the use of the tools developed by the software reliability modeling community. Rather, it is through the reporting of this and similar data that the modeling community can better understand the data obtained through operation of critical systems and hence develop finer tuned models for user-specific requirements. The results obtained through this analysis using the stepwise prediction and retrodictive fit of several standard software reliability models were not strong enough to justify the use of' any one of the models. More importantly, the predictive capabilities of the models were inhibited by the sparseness and variability of the criticality level 1 data, Some observations made in this analysis are as follows:
-the use of software reliability analysis techniques can present useful information in an operational context. These techniques are to aid the analysis of current status and provide predictions for future error occurrences. With continual updates on the "raw data" in the form of graphs and tables, intuitive analyses can aid the program managers in deciding to test further or to possibly even discontinue use of a current version of code and proceed to the next.
-the statistical models provided by the software reliability community are designed to provide probabilistic predictions for future discrepancies. This type of information can also support the safety critical systems operational community. It is only through the publication and sharing of safety critical systems failure data like the X-29A that the reliability modeling community can improve their techniques and models to more accurately represent similar system behavior.
-even if statistical results are not heavily relied upon, the heightened awareness created through the establishment and use of various data collection mechanisms with at least quick look analyses would realize benefits in reliability for any program.
More information from the program could and should be incorporated into the models to enable more rapid production of quality results. Finer tuned models designed for this type of operational software have the potential to enable prediction of error Occurrence and focus software testing for specific errors by criticality level. One of the greatest factors in reliability analysis of real-time, safety critical systems is the implications of failure.
With human life at risk, a purely statistical representation of the assessed reliability is not enough on which to base a life-critical decision to fly, but this information may be useful in determining when to fly.
7.
Conclusions Flight programs have evolved in complexity while at the same time flight schedules have become more aggressive. Traditionally, software reliability models have been developed for and on commercial software systems, where the user base is large with exposure to a wide variety of operational scenarios. However for many safety critical systems, especially within the research community, the target software is typically not duplicated beyond several instances and the operational testing is within the local community (as opposed to hundreds of users testing desktop application software). The implications of failure are also much greater within a safety critical system. Many engineers are inclined to believe that their software is naturally robust, and the present failure is the proverbial "last bug." These are often reasons why failure data are not collected and maintained, as it is oftentimes the notion that each failure is an anomaly unto itself and that there is no correlation between subsequent failures. This is not intuitively me and only a complete set of collected failure data would substantiate or negate this idea.
Software is increasingly used in safety critical systems, with its design and functionality becoming more complex. Tools and methods must be developed and instilled for use within the operational community that enable objective assessment of the reliability of the software system. One perspective that would provide aid for software reliability assessment is spawned from the hardware community and is based on occurrence of errors with respect to CPU time. The raw data graphs themselves provide the managers with an intuitive look at whether the code is becoming more or less reliable and hence help them to decide whether or not to fly.
A systems engineering approach to validating the flight control system entails utilizing full-up systems testing, operating the system in a manner in which it will be executed in actual flight, and running through the operational scenarios in a rigorous yet timely manner. This method has proved reliable to the Dryden community in the case of the X-29A flight control program. However the incorporation of reliability assessment methods within the context of any program, including X-29 program, could enable better resource scheduling and utilization, provide insight into the intensity as well as density of reported failures, and provide test engineers and managers with objective measurements within a subjective program.
The use of software reliability analysis techniques is achievable in any system involving software. Independent of the source language or the underlying philosophy (modular, structured, AI, neural networks), the analysis is the same because the system is evaluated objectively from a "black-box'' perspective. It is the result of the modeling and prediction that allows for subjective explanations.
By exercising engineering judgment when viewing the information represented by the failure and CPU data, reliability assessment can be performed from both subjective and objective views.
